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Abstract: In this paper we ask whether the withdrawal of a major employer (Pharmacia) from 
a region in Sweden (Uppsala) has had a negative effect on employment growth. We explore 
the possibility that the exit of Pharmacia may not have had a negative effect on the total 
employment in the region. It might be the case that new innovative resources with economic 
potential have been released due to the withdrawal leading to new firm formation and 
expansion of existing firms. We find no evidence that the withdrawal has led to a negative 
effect on employment growth in the region. 
 





Until 1995, Pharmacia AB was a Swedish-based company. However, in 1995, Pharmacia & 
Upjohn was formed through the merger of Pharmacia AB and Upjohn Company (PHARMACIA 
HOMEPAGE, 2002). The consequence has been a partial withdrawal of Pharmacia from the 
Uppsala region. In this paper this is referred to as the exit or withdrawal of Pharmacia. Due to 
the merger most of the management activities, ranging from supply, R&D and marketing, moved 
to the US based headquarters. Left in Sweden was mainly a big pharmaceutical production site 
and an equipment supplier, Pharmacia Biotech. About 200 employees lost their jobs in Pharmacia 
during the withdrawal. However, Pharmacia Biotech merged with British Amersham in 1997 
(AMERSHAM PRESS RELEASE, 1997).  In 2000, Pharmacia & Upjohn and the Monsanto Company 
formed the new company Pharmacia Corporation with its headquarters in the US, and in the 
spring of 2002 the American company Pfizer placed a bid on Pharmacia Corporation. In 
December of 2002 the Pharmacia Corporation announced that its shareholders voted in favour 
for the proposed merger (PHARMACIA PRESS RELESE, 2002). 
                                                 
* The author is grateful to Niclas Berggren, Gunnar Eliasson, Per Hortlund and Dan Johansson for valuable 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
  1In 1996 the Chamber of Commerce for Uppsala County (UPPSVENSKA HANDELSKAMMAREN, 
1996) surveyed the number of company start-ups related to the “exit of Pharmacia” in 1995. This 
was in response to political worries about a possible industrial decline in the Uppsala region due 
to the cutback and relocation of employees. Recently, however, Uppsala has been the focus of 
media attention as a new bio-tech boom area, contrary to earlier concerns it appears to be that 
the withdrawal of Pharmacia has released people with competence and skills that establish new 
firms. 
 
From this perspective the reorganization of Pharmacia and the entire Uppsala region in fact 
serves, as an interesting illustration of SCHUMPETER'S, 1942, creative-destruction process. 
 
It may be the case that the exit of a firm puts a dynamic process in motion that generates new 
and expanding firms that compensate for the initial employment loss, known as the creative 
destruction process (SCHUMPETER, 1942). Hence, exit does not necessarily have to be negative if 
it induces and releases resources for new firms formation and expansion of existing firms. It can 




Thus, in the case of Pharmacia one may expect, contrary to what many would believe, to find 
that the regional-growth has not been affected in form of a decreased growth in employment as a 
consequence of Pharmacia’s partial withdrawal from the Uppsala region. For instance, 
ARMINGTON and ACS, 2002, shows that regions with highly educated people (as in Uppsala) are 
much more likely to have a higher percentage of start-ups. The region also has a developed 
network
2 that can help enhance the entrepreneurial activity in the region. There are several 
researchers that have studied the importance of location for growth. GLASMEIER, 1986, shows 
that the high-tech firms might be constrained to a location by their need for specific labour skills. 
DAVIDSSON et al., 2002, on the other hand, find little evidence that location or region plays an 
important role for growth. However, GRAY  and PARKER, 1998, have studied the regional 
development of the US biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries and they found that firms in 
emerging industries follows a multifaceted location pattern, some emerge in new regions and 
some in mature regions that has a rich economic mix such as Uppsala.  
 
                                                 
1 There are also studies that have shown that unemployment is positively related to new firm formation i.e. start-ups 
(STOREY, 1991). However, AUDRETSCH  and FRITSCH, 1994, found that unemployment tends to depress firm 
formation.  
2 See for instance WALUSZEWSKI, 2002. 
  2This can be expressed as the following hypothesis: 
 
H0: The exit of Pharmacia in Uppsala has had a negative effect on growth. 
H1: The exit of Pharmacia in Uppsala has had no or a positive effect on growth. 
 
The H0 hypothesis is expected to be rejected, we assume that the exit of Pharmacia from Uppsala 
has had no, or a positive effect on growth. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section the data is described. Before presenting the 
econometric model we explore our data. Thereafter the econometric results are shown. The 
paper ends with a summary and conclusions.  
 
 
2. THE DATA 
 
Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB) compiles data on the number of firms, 
establishments and employment in different industries. Until 1993, data were classified according 
to The Swedish Industrial Classification System established in 1969 (SNI69), which corresponds 
to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) of the 
United Nations. However, ISIC is not used by the European Union, and therefore Sweden 
changed its classification system in 1993 to SNI92. SNI92 is the Swedish counterpart to the 
industrial classification system used in the European Union, Nomenclature Générale Activités 
Economiques dans les Communautés Européennes (NACE)
3 (STATISTICS SWEDEN, 1992). 
 
The econometric analysis is based on a set of data on establishments compiled by Statistics 
Sweden from the Central Register of Firms and Establishments (Centrala Företags- och 
Arbetsställeregistret, CFAR). CFAR covers all firms and establishments (sizes, industries, legal forms 
etc.) in Sweden. A firm can have many establishments.  
 
Whether or not one should use firm or establishment data for the econometric analysis depends 
on the stressed question. If one is concerned with a regional allocation problem, e.g. if one 
                                                 
3 Both SNI92 and SNI69 are an activity-based industry classification, which means that the units of production 
(establishments and firms) are classified in industries according to the activity carried out in the production unit and 
not in terms of what is produced. Activity is defined as the process where different factors of production and 
combinations of these are used to produce goods and services. Hence, the firms and establishments are classified 
into industries according to the nature of the process of production (STATISTICS SWEDEN, 1992). 
  3wishes to follow all activities in a municipality one should use establishment data since such data 
best represents physical activities and are well-defined geographically. Firms with production 
activities in Uppsala can be registered elsewhere and therefore establishment data is preferable for 
our analysis. 
 
The data set covers 1993 to 2000 and contains yearly observations on individual establishments 
under the following SNI codes (STATISTICS  SWEDEN, 1993-2001): 24410 and 24420 
(pharmaceutical industry), 33101, 33102, 33200 and 33400 (the medical instruments and 
laboratory equipment), and 73103 (institutes for research and development in medical sciences).
 4 
These codes are chosen because they represent a well-defined area where Pharmacia operates. 
 
SCB is not allowed to give out the organisational numbers or the names of the establishments for 
confidentiality reasons. Therefore, SCB assigns a unique identification number to each 
establishment when founded that follows the establishment through its “life”.
5 Hence, it is 
possible to identify and follow individual establishments, its local municipality and other 
categories collected by SCB, but not to identify the establishment by name or its organisational 
number. 
 
The data set consists of cross-sectional time-series data, so-called panel data. The panel, however, 
is unbalanced, i.e., we do not have observations on all establishments for all years. This is so 
because of the dynamics of establishment entry and exit. For example, many of the 
establishments did not exist in the beginning of the period (see further Table 1). Hence, the 
establishment has been replaced by a missing value.  
 
The data set can be described in a matrix; see Table 1. There are at most eight observations on 
each establishment (seven in the regressions). That is the case if the establishment has existed for 
all eight years. At a minimum, there is one observation on each establishment that is if the 
establishment was not entered until 2000 or only existed in 1993 and then exited. In total, the 
sample includes 13 049 establishments. Five different characteristics are identified for each 
observation (establishment). 
                                                 
4 In 1993 Sweden changed its classification system when adapting to the standards of the European Union. This 
makes it costly to follow establishments further back in time. 2000 is the latest year for which individual data are 
available on establishments. 
5 It is worth underlining that all Swedish establishments are obliged to register by law. The Swedish statistics on 
establishments are therefore encompassing and covers all establishments in the whole economy. This makes the 
Swedish data more complete than most international data; see KIRCHHOFF, 1994. 
  4Table 1. Different types of observations on establishments 
Establishments 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1           
2           




        
i)  X X X X X X X X 
ii)      X X X X X X 
iii)  X  X  X       
iv)    X  X  X      




        
N           
Source: Own table. 
Note: 
i)  Establishments existing the entire period. 
ii)  Establishments started after 1993 and existing by the end of the period. The period before is given a 
missing value.  
iii)  Establishments that existed in 1993 and exited during the period. The rest of the period is given a missing 
value. 
iv)  Establishments entering after 1993 and exiting before 1998. A combination of ii) and iii).  




3. EXPLORING THE DATA  
 
Before continuing with the econometric analysis, let us take a look at the number of 
establishments in Sweden in the pharmaceutical and medical technology industry, as we have 
defined it, and compare with the region of Uppsala, defined as the county. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 1, the number of establishments in Sweden is growing over time. 
There was a small decline in 1999 but that was caught up with very quickly. Over the whole 
period from 1993 to 2000, the number of establishments was growing from 1 956 to 3 103. In 
the Uppsala region, there were more fluctuations. The number of establishment was growing 
until 1997 and then diminished, but never dipped under the 1996 level. Over the period, the 



















Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
 
 
The pattern is somewhat different for the number of employees in the pharmaceutical and 
medical technology industry, our dependent variable in the econometric analysis. As can be seen 
in Figure 2, the number of employees in Sweden is constantly growing over the period 1993-
2000, except for the fall in 1999, this was also registered in the number of establishments. Over 
the whole period the number of employees grew from 37 775 to 51 733. 
 
In the Uppsala region, the number of employees grew from 3 633 to 4 627 employees between 
1993-2000. Despite the withdrawal of Pharmacia in 1995, the number of employees increased 






                                                 
6 Both exits and entries have increased over the studied period. 














Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
To test the hypothesis outlined in the beginning of the paper the following econometric model 
can be used: 
 
(1) GROWTHi,t = β0 + βage*AGEi, t-1 + βsize*SIZEi, t-1 + βage2*AGE
2
i, t-1  
+ βsize2*SIZE
2
i, t-1  + βowner*OWNERi, t-1 + βUppsala*UPPSALAi,  
+ βinteraction*INTERACTIONi,  + βd*Z
d + ui, t   
 
where  GROWTHi, t,  AGEi, t-1 and SIZEi, t-1 are vectors on the growth, age and size of 
pharmaceutical and medical technology establishments i at time t, t-1 and t-1, respectively. In 
addition to these variables, the model includes OWNERi, t-1, which denotes ownership (private or 
government owner), UPPSALAi, a dummy for the Uppsala region, INTERACTIONi,  an 
interaction variable between UPPSALAi and EXITi where EXITi is a dummy for the exit of 
Pharmacia and Z
d, which represents a vector with dummy variables; see below. AGE
2
i, t-1 and 
SIZE
2
i, t-1 are the quadratic forms of the age and size vectors. All of these variables are commonly 
used in empirical studies when available; see for instance EVANS, 1987a, 1987b.  
 
  7β0 is the intercept and ui, t the error term in the regression. The error term ui, t can be divided into 
an establishment-specific (µi), a time-specific (λt), and a random error term (vi, t), see e.g. 
BALTAGI, 1999: 
 
(2) ui, t = µi + λt + vi, t  
 
The variables are defined as follows:  
 
Dependent variable: 
GROWTHi, t: The change in the number of employees in establishment i between time t-1 and t 
(percent). Note that the percentage growth of establishments with zero employees in period t-1 
cannot be calculated since it involves a division with zero. Therefore, growth is defined to be 
zero if the number of employees is zero in period t-1 and period t. Moreover, growth is set at 100 
percent if the number of employees is zero in period t-1 and more than zero in period t. This is 
the lowest rate of growth for establishments with one employee in time t-1 that expand their 
employment. Thus, this approximation underestimates the percentage employment growth of 




AGEi, t-1: The age of the establishment i at time t-1. SCB registers the establishment when it 
becomes active by month and year.
8 An establishment starting at time t-1 is defined to be 1 year 
old, an establishment starting in time t-2 is defined to be 2 years old and so on.  
SIZEi, t-1: The size, number of employees of establishment i at time t-1. 
AGE
2
i, t-1: The age the establishment i at time t-1, raised to the second power. It is reasonable to 
expect a non-linear relationship between age and size, on the one hand, and growth, on the other. 




i, t-1: The size,number of employees of the establishment i at time t-1 raised to the second 
power. 
                                                 
7 Regressions where the dependent variable growth has been defined as the change in the number of employees in 
establishment i between time t-1 and t in absolute terms has also been conducted. The results are robust to this 
change of specification. 
8 Each establishment has an “activity code” taking on one of three values: 0 – the business activity has not yet 
started, 1 – the establishment has started its business activity, i.e., it is an active establishment, and 9 – the 
establishment has closed its business activity. An establishment is new the first year the activity code is set to 1. 
Similarly, an establishment is defined as having exited when the activity code is changed to 9. 
  8OWNERi, t-1: A dummy for ownership at time t-1, 1 if establishment i is owned by the 
government and 0 if it is privately owned. An establishment is defined as governmentally owned 
if government controls more than 50 percent of the votes of the firm that owns the 
establishment. 
UPPSALAi, t: A dummy taking on the value 1 if the establishment is situated in the municipality 
of Uppsala, i.e. if the establishment has the municipality code 380, otherwise 0.
9 
 
INTERACTIONi, t: An interaction variable defined as UPPSALAi, t-1 * EXITi, t-1. The interaction 
variable catches the regional effect on employment growth of the withdrawal of Pharmacia from 
the Uppsala region. EXITi, t: is a dummy taking on the value 1 when Pharmacia “exited” from the 
region in 1995 and the time after, otherwise 0, it is not included as an explanatory variable by it 
self in the model. 
 
Dummy variables: 
DPHARMA: A dummy taking on the value 1 if establishment i manufactures pharmaceuticals, 
otherwise 0.
10   
DINSTRUMENT: A dummy variable taking on the value 1 if establishment i manufactures 
medical instruments or laboratory equipment, otherwise 0.
11  
 
Three basic models are discussed in the literature when analysing cross-sectional time-series data 
econometrically: i) The ordinary least square (OLS) method, ii) the random-effects method and 
iii) the fixed-effect method (see, e.g., BALTAGI, 1999; HSIAO, 1999; and GREEN, 2000). The OLS 
estimation assumes no individual-specific effect (µi) or time-specific effect (λt). The random-
effect model assumes the individual specific effects (µi) to be random across time and the time-
specific effects (λt) to be random across individuals. Moreover, the random-effect model assumes 
the disturbances (ui, t) and the explanatory variables to be uncorrelated. The fixed-effect model 
assumes the effects (µi) and  (λt) to be constant.  
 
An F-test applied to the data rejects the poolability of the data, i.e., an OLS analysis is not 
suitable. A Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the disturbances (ui, t) and the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated. Thus, the fixed-effect model is used.  
                                                 
9 We have also done regressions on the county of Uppsala, that is municipality codes: 305, 319, 360, 380, 381 and 
382. The results are robust to these changes. 
10 That is, if establishment i is classified within industry code 24410 or 24420. 
11 That is, if establishment i is classified within industry code 33101, 33102, 33200 or 33400. 
  9In accordance with the previous discussion the hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
H0: βinteraction < 0 
 
In addition we also stress a number of supplementary hypotheses that are also tested 
econometrically in this paper, all common in research, see for example WAGNER, 1995; ALMUS 
and NERLINGER, 1999; and DAVIDSSON et al., 2002: 
 
H0: Firm age has no, or a positive, effect on firm growth. 
H1: Firm age has a negative effect on firm growth. 
 
H0: Firm size has no, or a positive, effect on firm growth. 
H1: Firm size has a negative effect on firm growth. 
 
H0: Government ownership has no, or a positive, effect on firm growth. 
H1: Government ownership has a negative effect on firm growth. 
 
We expect that the three additional hypotheses will be rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, i.e. that there is a negative relationship i) between firm age and firm growth ii) 
between firm size and firm growth as well as iii) between government ownership and firm 
growth. This is so because; 
 
i) On average new firms will grow faster than old firms, as radically new innovations with a great 
economic potential are generally expected to be introduced through the entry of new and young 
firms (ACS and AUDRETSCH, 1987a, 1987b, 1988). Old firms are on average regarded as more 
conservative and relying on well-known technology and as being locked into their old structures. 
They are also often large and have built-in difficulties when it comes to reorganising for new 
market conditions (ALMEIDA, 1999). On the other hand, exploring new terrain is risky, and a 
large fraction of the new and small firms should be expected to fail. Several other researchers 
have also found a negative relationship between age and growth; see for example ALMUS and 




  10ii) Further large firms have a reduced capability to generate and identify winners per unit of 
resource input compared to a corresponding number of small firms. The large firm, furthermore, 
have much larger resources for keeping bad projects longer, that would otherwise be rejected fast 
in the open market (ELIASSON and ELIASSON, 1996). From this it follows that the selection 
process is expected to be more dynamically efficient in terms of project selection in a group of 
small firms than in a large firm, this has also been emphasised by CARLSSON (1999). Also, small 
firms are more likely to provide a better entrepreneurial milieu than large firms because large 
firms have to be hierarchically organised due to their size (HANNAN and FREEMAN, 1984; and 
ACS and AUDRETSCH, 1987a, 1987b). Size seams to be negatively related to growth. This has been 
demonstrated in a number of empirical studies; EVANS, 1987a, 1987b; ALMUS and NERLINGER, 
1999; HALL, 1987; WAGNER, 1995; and DAVIDSSON et al., 2002. Also, see SUTTON, 1997, for a 
summary on the relationship between firm size and firm growth. 
 
iii) Government or public ownership is expected to have a negative effect on growth for several 
reasons. First, in the free market, there will be a selection according to the owners’ ability to 
manage the firm while politicians are appointed because of their competence to win elections 
(PELIKAN, 1988, 1993). Second, decision-making is bureaucratic in organisations run by 
politicians and often lacks flexibility (MOE, 1997; and WINTROBE, 1997). Third, since politically 
run organisations are managed by other criteria than economic efficiency, for instance vote 
maximisation (BERGGREN, 2000), they will have great difficulties accepting and correcting 
mistakes, such as closing down an operation or a firm because of a business mistake (ELIASSON, 
1990). See, e.g., VARIYAM  et al., 1992; and DEWENTER  and MALATESTA, 2001 for empirical 
investigations of ownership and the economic performance of firms. 
 
Hence we also test if: 
 
H0: βage ≥ 0  
H0: βsize ≥ 0.  
H0: βowner ≥ 0.  
 
All null hypotheses stressed above, are expected to be rejected. Age and size are expected to be 
negatively related to firm growth. Governmentally owned establishments are expected to grow 
more slowly than private establishments. And most interesting, the “exit” of Pharmacia is 
expected to have negative effect on employment growth. If the first hypothesis can be rejected it 
  11means that we can keep H1, that the withdrawal of Pharmacia in the Uppsala region has had no 





The correlations between the variables, as presented in Table 2, give us some indications of the 
relationship between the variables. The correlations between the variables are low. The only 
exception is a high correlation between, AGE and AGE
2 and SIZE and SIZE
2, which is not 
surprising. There is a weak correlation between EXIT and the AGE of the establishment. 
 
 
Table 2. Table of correlations 
 GROWTH  AGE  SIZE AGE2  SIZE2  OWNER  UPPSALA  EXIT  INTERACTION 
GROWTH  1 -.015  .003  -.013  .003  .004 .001  -.025  .001 
AGE  -.015 1  .014  .945  .002  -.014 .004  .191  .022 
SIZE  .003 .014  1  .033  .894 .071 .023  -.008  .016 
AGE2  -.013 .945  .033  1 .015 -.010 -.001  .166  .017 
SIZE2  .003 .002  .894  .015 1  .011 .015  -.004  .010 
OWNER  .004 -.014  .071  -.010  .011 1  .124  .006  .112 
UPPSALA  .001 .004  .023  -.001  .015 .124  1  .006  .876 
EXIT  -.025 .191  -.008 .166  -.004 .006  .006  1  .113 
INTERACTION  .001 .022  .016  .017  .010 .112  .876  .113  1 
Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations.  
 
 
In Table 3 the main explanatory variables, their mean, standard deviation and expected effect on 
growth are summarised.  
 
 
  12Table 3. Summary statistics 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.  dev.  Expected effect on growth 
GROWTH  Growth of employees (per cent) 
 
1.22 116.47   
AGE  Age of establishment (year) 
 
4.25 3.84  - 
SIZE  Size of establishment (employees) 
 
10.89 78.59  - 
AGE2  The quadratic form of age 
 
32.81 48.38  + 
SIZE2  The quadratic form of size 
 
6294.10 116578.24  + 
OWNER  The establishment is owned by the 
government  
.03 .18  - 
UPPSALA  Municipality belonging (Uppsala) 
 
.05 .22   
EXIT  Exit of Pharmacia 
 
.77 .42   
INTERACTION  Exit of Pharmacia * municipality 
belonging (Uppsala) 
.04  .20  0 or + 
Source: Statistic Sweden and own calculations. 
 
 
Turning to the regression results, Table 4 reports two different regressions. The regressions are 
done with the fixed-effect estimation technique.  
 
 
Table 4. Results from the regression 


























UPPSALA  -8.318 
(-.789) 
_ 













Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations. 
Note: t-value in parentheses. N=28 792. 
 
 
  13The R
2 in the first regression is low, 0.003. Other related studies also report low R
2 numbers e.g. 
EVANS, 1987b reports 0.14 and JOHANSSON, 2001 reports 0.019. The low R
2 is not surprising. 
Many, important explanatory variables are missing. A number of important explanatory variables 
had to be excluded because no data were available. All these variables are for the most part 
difficult to measure, even at the disaggregated level of our analysis.  
 
The result from the first regression largely supports other empirical studies on Swedish industry 
showing that age and size is negatively related to growth (see, e.g., DAVIDSSON et al., 1994a; 
1994b; HESHMATI, 2001; and JOHANSSON, 2001). The signs of the beta values supports the 
hypotheses outlined in the paper. They indicate that age, size and government ownership have a 
negative effect on growth. But the beta values are insignificant and we cannot reject the H0 
hypotheses. 
 
However, the marginal effects of AGE and SIZE on growth are more interesting. They are 
calculated and presented in Table 5. These marginal effects are not significant. However, the sign 
of the beta values and of the t-values are negative for AGE. For SIZE we cannot predict the 
effect it will have on growth. 
 
 
Table 5. Marginal effects of age and size on growth 
Variable  Regression 1  Regression 2 








Source: Statistics Sweden and own calculations.  
Note: The marginal effect of age on growth is calculated as: dGROWTH/dAGE = βage + 2 * βage2 * AGEavg, where 
AGEavg is the average age of firms. The standard error used to calculate t values is calculated as: σdGROWTH/dAGE = 
[var(βage ) + 4 * (AGEavg)2 * var(βage2 ) + 4 * AGEavg * cov(βage, βage2)]1/2. The marginal effect of size on growth is 
calculated in similar way.  
 
 
The most interesting variable is, however, the INTERACTION variable. We cannot reject the H0 
hypothesis. However, the beta coefficients, although insignificant, has the right sign. This 
indicates more new firm entry (establishments) and expansion of existing firms because of the 
Pharmacia withdrawal. Hence, the exit of Pharmacia from Uppsala – the largest employer in 
Uppsala – has no negative effect on employment. The econometric analysis is also supported by 
the descriptive analysis in the preceding section, which showed that employment in the 
pharmaceutical industry increased in Uppsala during the studied period. 
  146. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we study the effect on employment in the pharmaceutical and medical technology 
industries of the withdrawal of Pharmacia in the Uppsala region because of the merger with 
Upjohn in 1995. Our hypothesis, that we test econometrically, anticipates that the gradual 
withdrawal of Pharmacia release resources with an economic potential. Most of these resources 
are embodied in well-educated and industrially experienced individuals who have left, or lost their 
jobs in Pharmacia. It may be the case that the withdrawal puts a dynamic process in motion 
generating new and expanding firms that compensate for the initial employment loss. Therefore, 
the exit of Pharmacia may not have had a negative effect on total employment in the region not 
even in the short run. 
 
We could not reject our hypothesis that the exit of Pharmacia from the Uppsala region had no or 
a negative effect on employment. This implies that the withdrawal of Pharmacia did not lead to a 
decreased employment within the pharmaceutical and medical technology industry in the Uppsala 
region. The econometric result is also supported by the descriptive analysis showing that the 
employment in the industry increased after the exit of Pharmacia. One should also take into 
consideration that it goes fast to close down an industry while the total effects from new firm 
entry and expansion of firms probably will take longer time to show up. This means that our 
analysis, based on a rather short time period, probably relatively overestimates the negative 
effects of the exit compared to the positive effects on firm entry and firm expansion. 
 
This indicates more new establishments and expansion of existing firms. However, does this 
mean that the recommendation for policy should be to close down companies that are major 
employers? Of course not. Rather the result indicates that we should not support non-
competitive large firms that have been the case so many times due to concerns about 
unemployment. 
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